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REMARKS ON COERCION AND EXPLOITATION
ALAN WERTHEIMER

INTRODUCrION

I am delighted to be participating in this Symposium on coercion and
exploitation'-topics that are near and dear to my heart.' In the interests of
launching a preemptive strike in self-defense against those who will want to
take me to task on one legal issue or another and also in the interests of full
disclosure, I want to make clear that I am a political philosopher. I am not a
lawyer. I have never attended a single class in law school. My oldest child is
now a third-year student at Michigan Law School, but that's as close as I
come.
So my offerings will be philosophical, not legal. In an effort to further
reduce your expectations, thus reducing the gap between what you expect and
what I offer, I want to say at the outset that my philosophical message will
itself be largely deflationary. It will be filled with more distinctions than arguments. And the first distinction I shall make is to note that there are two ways
in which my remarks will be deflationary.
Roughly speaking, there are two philosophical questions about coercion
(let me bracket exploitation for the moment): (1) What counts as coercion?
and (2) When are individuals or the state justified in using coercion? The second question is, of course, a central problems of political philosophy. These
are the issues that we discuss under rubrics such as liberty, paternalism, moralism, and so forth. This is the topic of Mill's On Liberty' and Joel Feinberg's
four volume treatise on the scope of the criminal law." And this, I suspect, is
the issue at stake in the session on Coercion and Confinement.
Although I am happy to enter discussions of those issues, my first deflationary point is that I shall have nothing to say here about the justification of
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coercion. Rather, I shall be interested in the first and seemingly less morally
charged issue-namely, what counts as coercion and exploitation. I suspect
that this is the question that is at stake in the sessions on coercive and exploitative bargaining and coerced confessions.
My second deflationary point is that I shall argue that the questions (and
their facsimiles)-what counts as coercion? What is valid or meaningful consent? What is exploitation?-are much less important than they first seem. Let
me say a bit more about this at the outset. A standard picture about the role of
conceptual analysis with respect to topics such as coercion and consent goes
something like this: we start with a principle that agreements are valid and/or
should be permitted if they are consensual or voluntary.' By contrast, if an
agreement is the result of coercion or is made under duress or fraud, then the
agreement or decision is invalid, or we can justify prohibiting the formation of
the agreement, ex ante. It is then suggested that to determine which
agreements should be treated as invalid or prohibited, we should engage in an
analysis of the concept of coercion (and related concepts such as fraud and
consent). If such an analysis can, for example, tell us what counts as coercion,
we can then identify the agreements that should be treated as invalid or prohibited.
I believe that this picture of conceptual analysis is mistaken. The concepts
of coercion and exploitation provide important templates by which we organize many of the moral issues in which we are interested, but they cannot do
much more than that. The questions as to what agreements should be treated
as invalid and what behaviors should be prohibited will be settled by moral
argument informed by empirical investigation rather than conceptual analysis.
Inquires into the essence of coercion or exploitation will prove to be of limited
help with respect to the substantive questions in which we are interested.
Consent as Morally Transformative
Let us begin by noting that the organizers of this Symposium are not, I
believe, interested in coercion and exploitation as free standing concepts. This
Symposium is not dedicated to conceptual analysis, per se. We are interested
in coercion and exploitation because consent is typically morally and legally
transformative-that is, it changes the moral and legal relationship between
parties to an agreement and between those parties and others-and because
coercion and exploitation may seem to threaten that moral transformation.6
Let us note a few ways in which consent is morally transformative: B's consent may legitimate or render permissible an action by A that would not be
legitimate without B's consent, as when B's consent to surgery transforms A's
act from a battery to a permissible medical procedure. B's consent to transact
with A provides a reason for others not to interfere with that transaction, as

5. This principle is, of course, only prima facie. There may be good reasons not to uphold
or permit some uncontroversially voluntary agreements.
6. I borrow the phrase "morally transformative" from Heidi M. Hurd, The Moral Magic of
Consent, 2 LEGAL THEORY 121, 124 (1996). In what follows, I will not distinguish between moral
and legal transformation.
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when B's consent to let A put a tatoo on her arm gives C a reason to leave
them be. And B's consent may give rise to an obligation to A. If B consents
to do X for A, B ordinarily acquires an obligation to do X for A.
To say that B's consent is morally transformative is not to say that B's
consent is either necessary or sufficient to change an "all things considered"
moral judgment about A's or B's action. It may be legitimate for A to perform
surgery on a delusional or unconscious B without B's consent. It may be
wrong for A to perform surgery on B even with B's consent if the procedure
is not medically indicated.7 Similarly, we may think that exchanging money
for sexual relations is wrong even if the prostitute consents to the exchange.8
But this does not show that the prostitute's consent is not morally
transformative. After all, the prostitute's consent to sexual relations with A
eliminates one very important reason for regarding A's behavior as wrong,
namely, that A had sexual relations with B without her consent. The
prostitute's consent may provide a strong although not dispositive moral reason for not interfering with A's and B's behavior.
The Logic of Consent Arguments
To put the point of the previous section schematically, we are interested
in the following sort of argument:
Major Premise: If, in response to A's proposal, B voluntarily consents to do X, then B's agreement to do X is binding or valid (or A
and B should be permitted to enter into such agreements).
Minor Premise: B has not voluntarily consented to do X because A's
proposal has coerced B to consent to do X.
Conclusion: B's agreement to do X is not binding or valid (or A and
B should not be permitted to enter into such agreements).
Given the major premise, it seems that we must determine when the minor
premise is true if we are going to know when the conclusion is warranted. For
that reason, we may be tempted to think that an analysis of the concept of
coercion will identify the criteria or necessary and sufficient conditions of
coercion, and that empirical investigation can then (in principle) determine if
those criteria are met. If the criteria are met, then the minor premise is true
and the conclusion follows. If not, then the minor premise is false and the
conclusion does not follow.
If things were only so simple. It is a mistake to think that we will be able
to make much progress towards resolving the substantive moral and legal
issues in which we are interested by philosophical resources internal to the
concept of coercion (or consent). In the final analysis, we are always going to

7. For example, it may be wrong for a physician to accede to a beggar's request to have his
leg amputated so that he can enhance his success as a beggar.
8. "It is a non sequitur, but a disturbingly common one, to argue from the premise that
some act is bad because it is nonconsensual, to the conclusion that the same act, ff consensual, is
therefore good ....
Robin West, A Comment on Consent, Sex, and Rape, 2 LEGAL THEORY 233,
247 (1996).
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have to ask: Given the facts that relate to issues of coercion, how should we
think about the moral and legal status of a transaction or relationship? In that
sense, I am squarely in the camp that maintains that the best account of coercion is normative. To say that coercion is normative or moralized is not-as
some have thought--to say that it is vague or subjective or has no correct
application. The antinomy of normative is empirical or value-neutral, not objective or precise.
In suggesting that coercion is essentially normative, I do not deny that it
is possible to produce a morally neutral or empirical account of coercion that
would allow us to determine whether B is coerced by reference to specific
empirical criteria (such as B's state of mind). I do maintain that if we were to
operate with a morally neutral account of coercion, we would have to go on to
ask whether that sort of coercion renders B's agreement invalid and that we
will be unable to answer that question without introducing substantive moral
arguments. In the final analysis, it does not matter much whether we adopt a
thin morally neutral account of consent or a thick morally laden account of
consent. Either way, the point remains that we will not be able to go from a
morally neutral or empirical account of coercion to interesting moral or legal
conclusions without introducing substantive moral arguments. The only question (to paraphrase a commercial for motor oil) is whether we want to pay the
moral price up front by including moral considerations within our account of
coercion or pay the moral price after we have determined that A's proposal
has coerced B but before we say that the agreement is invalid.
The Fallacy of Equivocation
Precisely because we can pack a lot or a little into our account of coercion, it is all too easy for a "coercion argument" to commit the fallacy of
equivocation, where the meaning of coercion assumed by the major premise is
not identical to the meaning of coercion in the minor premise, and thus the
conclusion does not follow even though both the major premise and minor
premise may be true (given different meanings of a word).
Consider a classic problem" of political philosophy: Do citizens have a
general (prima facie) obligation to obey the laws of society? A standard argument goes like this:
Major Premise: One is obligated to obey the laws if one consents to
do so.
Minor Premise (Version-i): One who remains in his society rather
than leaves thereby gives his consent to that society (Plato).9
Minor Premise (Version-2): One who benefits from living in a soci-

9. Plato described the basis for this consent
You have never left the city, even to see a festival, nor for any other reason except
military service; you have never gone to stay in any other city, as people do; you have
had no desire to know another city or other laws; we and our city satisfied you. So
decisively did you choose us and agree to be a citizen under us.
PLATO, Crito, in THE TRIAL AND DEATH OF SOCRATES 52 (G.M.A. Grube trans., 1975).
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ety gives his consent to that society (Locke). 0
Conclusion: One who does not leave his society or benefits from
living in a society has an obligation to obey its laws.
Is either version of the minor premise true? The problem is this: there may be
a linguistically plausible sense in which one who accepts the benefits of one's
government has consented to that government or in which one who remains in
one's society has consented to remain in that society. In that sense, both versions of the minor premise may be true. But, even if that were so, the conclusion may not follow. We will have to determine if the type or strength of
consent that figures in the major premise has been met in the minor premise.
And it may not. Thus we could agree with Plato that there is a sense in which
one who does not leave his society gives his consent, while also agreeing with
Hume that it is not the sort of free consent that would justify the ascription of
a strong obligation to obey the law." We can make a similar point about
Locke's view.
A similar point can be made about the concept of harm. Suppose we start
from the Millian principle that the state can justifiably prohibit only that conduct that causes harm to others. The following questions arise: Does the psychic distress caused by hate speech count as harmful? Does trespass that causes no physical damage to one's property constitute a harm? Does a peepingtom harm his target? Clearly there is a sense in which psychic distress caused
by hate speech is harmful. As a matter of empirical psychology, it is simply
untrue that "sticks and stones will break your bones, but names will never hurt
you" (just as it is untrue that absence makes the heart grow fonder). And there
is clearly a sense in which one has not been harmed by trespass which causes
no physical damage, or by the peeping tom, particularly if the target is unaware of his voyeurism. But these observations will not tell us which activities
can be legitimately prohibited by the state under the Millian principle. 2
So we can opt for a morally neutral or moralized account of harm. We
can opt for a morally neutral or neurological account of harm, but we will

10. The benefits derived from society compel consent, according to Locke.
[Elvery man that hath any possessions, or enjoyment of any part of the dominions of
any government, doth thereby give his tacit consent, and is as far forth obliged to obedience to the laws of that government during such enjoyment ... whether this his possession be of land to him and his heirs for ever, or a lodging only for a week; or
whether it be barely travelling freely on the highway.
JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT c. 8 § 119 (J.W. Gough ed., 3d ed. 1956).
11. Hume questions the consent to a society by one who remains in that society:
Can we seriously say, that a poor person or artisan has a free choice to leave his country, when he knows no foreign language or manners, and lives, from day to day, by the
small wages which he acquires? We may as well assert that a man, by remaining in a
vessel, freely consents to the dominion of the master, though he was carried on board
while asleep, and must leap into the ocean and perish, the moment he leaves her.
DAvID HuME, Of the Original Contract, in HtuME's MORAL AND POLxrCAL PHrLOsOPHY 363
(1948).
12. "The question is ... not what 'harm' really means, but what reasons of principle there
are for preferring one conception to another.. . the question is not simply which is the better
conception of harm, but which conception answers more adequately to the purposes for which the
concept is deployed." JEREMY WALDRON, LBERAL RIGHTS 119-20 (1993).

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:4

then have to go on to ask whether harm so defied should be prohibited and
whether some acts excluded by that definition can be legitimately prohibited.
We can opt for a moralized account of harm, say one in which one is harmed
if one's rights or moral interests are violated. On this view, we could maintain
that the psychic distress caused by hate speech does not count as a harm because it does not violate one's rights, whereas trespassing and voyeurism do
count as harm because they violate one's rights to property and privacy. 3
A similar danger of equivocation arises with respect to coercion. Consider
Harry Frankfurt's example:
The courts may refuse to admit in evidence, on the grounds that it
was coerced, a confession which the police have obtained from a
prisoner by threatening to beat him. But the prisoner's accomplices,
who are compromised by his confession, are less likely to agree that
he was genuinely coerced into confession. 4
Was the prisoner's confession coerced? There is no reason to think that there
must be a single acceptable answer to this question. The answer to this question will depend upon the sort of moral transformation that consent is meant to
trigger. We may think that the sort of pressure to which the prisoner was
subject may be sufficient to deprive his confession of legal validity. At the
same time, and if there is anything like honor among thieves, the very same
pressures may not be sufficient to excuse his betrayal of his accomplices. (We
need not assume the prisoners are thieves; they may be political prisoners in a
just cause). It will do no good to ask what appears to be a conceptual and
empirical question: Was his confession coerced or not? Rather, we need to
answer two moral questions: What sorts of pressures on prisoners to confess
are sufficient to bar the introduction of the confession as evidence? and What
sorts of pressures on prisoners are sufficient to excuse the ascription of blame
by those to whom the prisoner has obligations of silence? These are irreducibly moral questions, not questions about the concept of coercion.
I have said much more about coercion than exploitation to this point.
Whereas we are inclined to refer to some agreements as coerced, other agreements are more naturally characterized as exploitative. And I shall try to say
something-about the character of exploitative agreements. It is worth noting
that whereas the moral force of coercion is relatively clear, as a coerced agreement is not binding, the moral force of exploitation is not clear, for it is not
obvious what follows from characterizing an agreement as exploitative. But
before proceeding further with an analysis of both exploitation and coercion, it
will prove useful to get some more concrete examples in mind. So let me
introduce some cases in very simplistic or stylized form.

13. I am not maintaining that this is what we should say on a moralized account of harm,
only that such an account allows us to make these distinctions.
14. Harry G. Frankfurt, Coercion and Moral Responsibility in ESSAYS ON FREEDOM OF ACTION 65 (Ted Honderich ed., 1973).
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Cases
1. Extortion: A proposes to break the windows on B's store unless B agrees
to hire A to collect B's garbage for an exorbitant fee. B agrees.
2. AZT: A owns the patent on AZT, a drug that offers some help to patients
with AIDS. A proposes to sell a year's supply of AZT to B, who has AIDS,
for $8,000. B agrees.
3. Enlistment: A proposes to offer B monetary compensation if B enlists in the
army. Because B lacks any decent civilian career opportunities, B enlists.
4. Stripper A proposes to hire B as a topless dancer. B, who has been admitted to law school, accepts A's proposal because she expects to earn up to
$1,000 a night. 5
5. Surrogacy: A, whose wife is infertile, proposes to pay B $10,000 to become
impregnated with A's sperm through artificial insemination and waive custody
rights to the child upon birth. B, who is not affluent, agrees.
6. Automobile: A, a used car dealer, turns back the odometer on a car and
sells it to B for a price that B would not have paid if she had known the car's
true mileage.
7. Organs: A, who suffers from a kidney ailment, proposes to buy one of B's
kidneys for $25,000. 6B, a poor Egyptian with a wife and several children,
accepts A's proposal.'
8. Psychotherapy: A, a psychotherapist, proposes to B, his patient, that they
have sexual relations. Because B is in the grips of transference and is sexually
attracted to A, B agrees.
9. Unfair Rescue: A, a tug, encounters a ship (B) in distress and proposes to
take it in tow for a fee that greatly exceeds the normal market price for such
services. B agrees.
10. Fair Rescue: A, a tug, encounters a ship (B) in distress and proposes to
take it in tow for a fee that is no greater than the normal market price for such
services and from which A makes only a modest profit. B agrees.
11. Lumber: There has been a hurricane in Florida. A, a lumber retailer, triples
his price for lumber. B, who needs lumber to rebuild, pays A's price.
12. Drowning: A comes upon B, who is drowning. A proposes to rescue B if
B agrees to pay A $10,000. A and B know that there are no other potential
rescuers.
13. Lecherous Millionaire: B's child will die unless she receives expensive
surgery for which the state will not pay. A, a millionaire, proposes to pay for
the surgery if B will agree to become his mistress.
14. Experimentation with Prisoners: A (the state) offers B (a prisoner) various
benefits, such as a reduced work schedule, a color television, higher quality
food, or the likelihood of earlier parole, if B will allow a drug company to test

15.
16.

Nick Ravo, Topless Barsfor a Crowd in Pinstripes,N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1992, at C1.
Chris Hedges, Egypt's Desperate Trade, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1991, at Al.
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the safety of a drug on B. B agrees.
15. Attractive Offer: A, a prestigious Ivy League university offers B (a full
professor at a reputable state university) a large salary, a reduced teaching
load, and her own secretary, if B will join university A. B accepts.
16. Surgery: A proposes to amputate B's leg for a fair fee. Because B will die
unless she agrees to the amputation, B authorizes A to perform the surgery.
17. Plea Bargaining: A, a prosecutor, tells B that B can plead guilty to second
degree homicide, in which case, the maximum punishment is 30 years, or
stand trial for first degree homicide, conviction for which might result in execution. B pleads guilty to second degree homicide.
18. Norplant: A, a judge, tells B, who has been convicted of a drug offense,
that he will place her on probation if she allows a court designated doctor to
implant the contraceptive Norplant in her arm. B agrees.
19. Ticket Scalping: A buys a block of tickets to a rock concert for $50 and
proposes to sell tickets to B for $200. Because B has no viable alternatives, B
agrees.
20. Dance Studio: A, a dance instructor, gets B, a 60-year-old widow, to believe that she has talent for ball-room dancing, and proposes that B purchase
$50,000 in dance lessons. Although the payment would require B to sell her
home, B agrees.
21. POW: A, proposes to take B as a prisoner of war and provide benevolent
quarantine, if but only if B agrees to give up fighting his captors. If B does
not surrender, A will attempt to kill B as an enemy soldier. B accepts A's
proposal.
22. Part-Time Professors: A, a university, proposes to pay B, an unemployed
academic, $2,000 a section to teach a section (or sections) of basic writing, or
French, or whatever. B agrees.
23. Unprofitable Employer A, whose firm will go out of business unless he
can reduce his labor costs, proposes to continue to employ B if B agrees to a
reduction in her salary. B accepts.
Coercion and Exploitation: A First Cut
Which of these agreements are exploitative? Which of these agreements.
are coercive? Although I shall try to say something about both exploitation
and coercion, in the final analysis I do not believe that much turns on whether
we can legitimately say that one agreement or another is exploitative or coercive on some linguistically plausible account of these terms. Rather, the
crucial questions concern the moral status of such agreements: Should they be
prohibited? Should they be enforceable? Or does the description of the agreement as coercive or exploitative have some other moral force?
Let us begin with the two central concepts. Exploitation and coercion
appear to have different foci. Whereas coercion refers to the formation of an
agreement, exploitation seems to always include reference to the substance or
outcome of an agreement. A wrongfully exploits B when A takes unfair ad-
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vantage of B, but A can coerce B to agree to do X without exploiting B, as
when A paternalistically coerces B to make an agreement that will serve B's
interests but not A's.
Exploitation
Let us consider two dimensions of exploitative agreements: (1) the effect
of the agreement on B's interests; and (2) the voluntariness of B's agreement. 7 If one considers the definitions of exploitation that have appeared in
the philosophical literature, one finds disagreement on both dimensions. On
some views, an agreement between A and B is exploitative only if it is harmful to B. 8 On other views, exploitation can be beneficial to the exploitee.' 9
On some views, exploitative agreements are always coerced or involuntary."
On other views, exploitation can occur "despite the exploitee's fully voluntary
consent to the exploitative behavior."'" I think it would be a mistake to tighten up the criteria of exploitation prematurely. Indeed, if agreements are exploitative only when they are also harmful or coerced, exploitation would be
of much less theoretical interest. We do not need to be moral rocket scientists
to argue that harmful exploitation may be legitimately prohibited by the state
or that coerced agreements are neither morally nor legally binding. By contrast, it is more interesting to consider whether we might be justified in prohibiting or refusing to enforce an agreement that is beneficial to B, that is not
the result of a direct threat to B, and that B (rationally) wants to make.
For these reasons, I shall distinguish between harmful exploitation and
mutually advantageous exploitation.22 By harmful exploitation, I refer to
agreements that are beneficial to A but are harmful to B. By mutually advantageous exploitation, I refer to agreements that are beneficial to the exploiter
(A) and are also beneficial to the exploitee (B). In the language of economics,
these agreements are Pareto superior They leave both parties better off. If we
reflect on the list of examples, it seems clear that whereas some allegedly exploitative agreements are harmful to the exploitee (as in Extortion), others
seem to be beneficial to B, at least as contrasted with the alternative of nonagreement (Lumber). We say that the mutually advantageous agreements are

17.

1 believe that exploitative agreements must also be advantageous to A, but I shall ignore

that dimension of exploitation in this paper.
18. "Persons are exploited if (1) others secure a benefit by (2) using them as a tool or resource so as (3) to cause them serious harm." STEPHEN R. MuNzER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 171
(1990).
19. For example, Andrew Levine states:
An exploitative exchange is ...an exchange in which the exploited party gets less than
the exploiting party, who does better at the exploited party's expense..... mhe exchange must result from social relations of unequal power .... Exploitation can be
entered into voluntarily; and can even, in some sense, be advantageous to the exploited

party.
ANDREW LEvNE, ARGUING FOR SOCIALISM 66-70 (1988).

20. "It is the fact that the [capitalist's] income is derived through forced, unpaid, surplus
[wage] labor, the product of which the workers do not control, which makes [wage labor]
exploitive." Nancy Holmstrom, Exploitation, 7 CANADIAN J. OF PHiL. 353, 357 (1977).
21. JOEL FEINBERG, HARjmLEss WRONGDOING 176 (1988).
22. Id. at 176-87.
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exploitative because we think that the content of the agreement is unfair or
wrong. 3 Without prejudging whether our account of what makes a transaction fair is correct, we may think that a transaction is exploitative because the
price that B must pay is too high (AZT, Rescue, Lumber) or perhaps because
the compensation that B receives is too low (Surrogacy). In other cases, we
may say that an agreement is exploitative because it involves the exchange of
a good or service that should not be exchanged for money (Enlistment,
Surrogacy, Organs, Lecherous Millionaire) or because we think that the service is degrading (Stripper).
It will prove similarly useful to distinguish between consensual exploitation and nonconsensual exploitation. By nonconsensual exploitation, I refer to
agreements in which A coerces B (as in Extortion) or in which A's action
inducing B's agreement suffers from a cognitive defect (as in Automobile,
Dance Studio, and Psychotherapy). By consensual exploitation, I refer to those
cases in which A does not threaten B with an adverse consequence should B
refuse to agree and in which B's agreement represents a reasonable, non-distorted decision under the circumstances (as in Unfair Rescue). There will, of
course, be controversies as to whether an agreement is harmful or advantageous to B or exploitative at all. Those judgments will require us to develop
and apply criteria for harm and fairness. In my view, we can say that the
agreement is harmful to B in Extortion and Automobile. And it is likely to be
harmful in Psychotherapy. In all the remaining cases, it is at least plausible to
argue that the agreements are beneficial to B, even if they are also exploitative. Whether an agreement is actually harmful will depend on factual inqui:
ries, for example, the effects of surrogacy on surrogate mothers. It may also
depend on moral inquiries, for example, whether an activity is degrading,
whether degradation is a harm to the person who is degraded, and, if so,
whether the harm of degradation exceeds the benefits to B, all things considered.24 Moreover, whether an agreement that is mutually advantageous is also
exploitative will depend on whether it is a fair agreement, for "high prices"
are not necessarily "unfair prices." If A is demanding a fair price for AZT,
given the research, development, and production costs of producing the drug,
then there is no exploitation.'
Still, it might be argued that even to consider mutually advantageous and
consensual transactions as exploitative is to fundamentally misconceive the
nature of exploitation, that there can be no wrongful exploitation if both parties gain from and consent to a transaction. I do not want to quarrel over
words or labels. If someone wishes to insist that exploitation must be harmful
and/or nonconsensual, then we can say that the cases of mutually advantageous consensual but arguably unfair agreements are cases of "mexploitation"
or shmexploitation or whatever. I am interested in the moral character of cer-

23. A moral defect in the distribution of benefits is, I believe, a necessary condition of exploitation. It may not be sufficient.
24. For example, even if a stripper is degraded and therefore harmed by her stripping, it is
possible that the gains to her from the activity exceed the harm.
25. Of course, we may think that B should not have to pay A's price out of his pocket, even
if A is not exploiting B.
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tain sorts of transactions and relationships, whatever we want to call them. I
believe, however, that we call at least some of these cases exploitative.
Coercion
There will be similar controversies as to whether B's agreement is
nonconsensual. The voluntariness of B's agreement is clearly defeated by
coercion in Extortion and fraud in Automobile. In Psychotherapy, the
voluntariness of B's agreement may be compromised by transference. In
Dance Studio, the voluntariness of B's agreement may be compromised by
manipulation of B's beliefs and desires. In many of the remaining cases (AZT,
Enlistment, Stripper, Surrogacy, Organs, Unfair Rescue, and Lumber), it is
plausible to maintain that the transaction is consensual, at least in the sense
that it is plausible to maintain that A does not propose to violate B's rights if
B rejects A's proposal.
But that does not end things. There are consensual agreements and consensual agreements. In many of these cases, B agrees to A's proposal because
B's situation is desperate or because B believes that she has no better alternative. And, it may be thought that at least some such agreements are rightly
regarded as coerced. Consider B's decision to serve as a surrogate mother.
Many commentators have argued that such decisions are coerced: "[A monetary offer] may be difficult for a person of little financial means to refuse and
'
would, in that case, be coercive."26
The opposing view maintains that surrogacy offers women an additional option to their present menu of choices, and
that additional options are never coercive.'
Which view is correct? Rather than try to answer that question directly, I
propose to take a different tack. I propose to temporarily put aside the questions as to what counts as coercion and exploitation. Instead, and with reference to the cases that I have described, I shall first enumerate several different
characteristics of such proposals and acceptances in which we might be interested. I will then distinguish among several possible moral judgments we
might make with respect to agreements and sketch some possible relations
between the characteristics of proposals and acceptances and the various moral
judgments. The crucial question, after all, is how certain specific characteristics of proposals and acceptances are related to certain specific moral judgments and not whether we call them coercive or exploitative.

26. Ruth Macklin, Is There Anything Wrong with Surrogate Motherhood?, in SURROGATE
MOTHERHOOD 136, 146 (Larry Gostin ed. 1990). Rosemarie Tong adds "[tlo say that a woman

'chooses' to do this... is simply to say that when a woman is forced to choose between poverty
and exploitation, she sometimes chooses exploitation as the lesser of two evils." Rosemary Tong,
The Overdue Death of a Feminist Chameleon: Taking a Stand on Surrogacy Arrangements, 21 J.
OF SOC. PHIL. 40, 45 (1990). Martha Field argues that "to portray surrogacy contracts as representing meaningful choice and informed consent on the part of the contracting surrogate mother,
rather than to see her as driven by circumstances ... [fails] to take account of realities." MARTHA
A. FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD 27 (1990).
27. See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, The Genetic Tie, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 209, 247-48 (1995).
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Characteristicsof Choice Situations
Status Quo
In some cases, such as Extortion, Unprofitable Employer, and Plea
Bargaining, A proposes to make B worse off than B's present status quo or
pre-proposal baseline if B rejects A's proposal. In other cases, A proposes to
leave B in B's present status quo if B rejects the proposal. Because we often
refer to the latter sorts of proposals as offers, most of the cases above can be
described as offers rather than threats. This would include, among others,
AZT, Enlistment, Stripper, Unfair Rescue, Fair Rescue, Attractive Offer, Surgery, Part-time Professor.
Moralized Baseline
In some cases, A proposes to violate B's rights if B does not accept A's
proposal. In some cases, A proposes not to do what A has an obligation to B
to do if B does not accept A's proposal. Let us say that in both such cases, A
proposes to make B worse off relative to B's moralized baseline if B does not
accept A's proposal. In other cases, A does not propose to make B worse off
relative to B's moralized baseline if B rejects A's proposal. From this perspective, we might say that Plea Bargaining and Unprofitable Employer are
cases in which A proposes to make B worse off than B's status quo but A
does not propose to make B worse off than B's moralized baseline if B refuses A's proposal. By contrast, if A has an obligation to rescue B for free in
Drowning, then A does propose to make B worse off than B's moralized
baseline if B rejects A's proposal, although A does not propose to make B
worse off than B's status quo if B rejects A's proposal. Setting B's moral
baseline is often controversial. We can disagree, for example, as to whether A
does have an obligation to rescue B for free in Drowning. Still, there is a
distinction between the claim that a proposal would make B worse off relative
to her status quo and the claim that a proposal would make B worse off than
her moralized baseline.
Rationality
In some cases, B's decision to accept A's proposal is arguably irrational
in terms of B's stable long-term preferences. This may occur when A employs
deception as in Automobile and Dance Studio or manipulates B's judgment as
in Psychotherapy. In addition, even if A does not intend to distort B's decision-making capacity, A's proposal may lead B to make a decision that cannot
reasonably be expected to serve B's long-term interests or aims, perhaps because B underestimates the long-term costs of accepting A's proposal. This
may or may not be true in Enlistment, Surrogacy, Organs, Experimentation,
Stripper, Norplant, and Lecherous Millionaire. In still other cases, however,
there is no reason to doubt the rationality of B's decision to accept A's proposal, and this includes cases that fall on both sides of the first two distinctions, for example, Extortion, AZT, Unfair Rescue, Fair Rescue, Drowning,
Attractive Offer, Surgery, Plea Bargaining, Part-time Professor, POW,
Unprofitable Employer, and Ticket Scalping. Just as there is no reason to
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doubt the rationality of B's decision in Attractive Offer and Fair Rescue, there
is no reason to doubt the rationality of B's decision in Extortion and Unfair
Rescue.
No Other Rational Choice
In some cases we may say not only that B is acting rationally or reasonably in accepting A's proposal, we may say that A has no other rational
choice but to accept A's proposal. This might be true in Extortion, AZT, Unfair Rescue, Fair Rescue, Lumber, Drowning, Surgery, POW, and Attractive
Offer. In other cases, we may think that while it might be reasonable for B to
accept A's proposal, it may also be reasonable for B to refuse. This might be
true of Enlistment, Stripper, Surrogacy, Organs, Lecherous Millionare, Experimentation, Norplant, Part-time Professor.
Desperation
In some cases, B's status quo is arguably desperate, for example, AZT,
Organs, Unfair Rescue, Fair Rescue, Drowning, Surgery, POW, Lecherous
Millionare. In other cases, B's status quo is not desperate, but it is arguably
not good, for example, Enlistment, Surrogacy, Part-time Professor, Unprofitable Employer. In still other cases, there is no reason to think that B's status
quo is objectively unsatisfactory, for example, Stripper, Automobile, Attractive
Offer, and Ticket Scalping. Note that some cases in which B has no rational
choice but to accept A's proposal are ones in which B's present situation is
desperate, but not in all (as in Attractive Offer).
Unjust Background Conditions
In some cases, B's status quo is unjust; in other conditions, it is not.
Whether this is so will, of course, depend upon a theory of justice. In any
case, the injustice of B's status quo may be related to but is independent from
desperation. Thus, B's status quo is desperate but not obviously unjust in
Surgery, Drowning, Unfair Rescue, Plea Bargaining, POW, and Lecherous
Millionare. B's status quo in Enlistment and Surrogacy might be unjust, even
if it is not desperate, depending upon whether people would be in B's status
quo situation in a just society. It is important to note that the injustice of B's
background conditions must be distinguished from B's "moralized baseline"
with respect to A: Whereas justice may require that society place B in a better
status quo, it may not require A to do so.
Fair Terms
In some cases, the terms of the transaction may be fair on some plausible
criterion of fairness, for example, Stripper, Fair Rescue, Surgery, POW, Plea
Bargaining. In some cases, such as Unprofitable Employer, we may think that
A's proposal is not "fair" by some independent standard, but A may not be in
a position to make a better proposal (although here we may have to rethink
our conception of fairness). By contrast, in other cases, the terms of the
transaction may be unfair and A may well be in a position to make a better
proposal, as in, for example, Unfair Rescue, Drowning, Part-time Professor,
Ticket Scalping, and AZT. Let me note here that while "equal utility gain"
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might be advanced as a criterion of a fair transaction, I believe that this criterion is mistaken. The exploitee typically gains more utility from a transaction
than the exploiter. Indeed, it is precisely because the exploiter stands to gain
relatively little from the transaction that he is able to drive what we may take
to be an exploitative bargain.
Incommensurability and Commodification
In some cases, A's proposal may ask B to choose between goods that
should not be treated as commensurable or treated as commodities, as in, for
example, Stripper, Surrogacy, Organs, Lecherous Millionare, Experimentation,
and Norplant. In saying that A's proposal gives rise to a problem of
incommensurability or commodification, I do not mean that B might not reasonably regard herself as better off if B accepts A's proposal; I mean simply
that A's proposal requires B to exchange one good (e.g., money, better prison
conditions, probation) for another good (bodily exposure, procreational labor,
organs, sexual services, bodily risk, non procreation) that ought not to be
exchanged for that good.
Rationality and All the Others
Before going forward, I want to stress that the rationalityof B's decision
is entirely separable from all of the other criteria (except the no other rational
choice criterion). That B will be worse off than B's status quo if B rejects A's
proposal, or that A proposes to violate B's rights (or to do less than A has an
obligation to do) if B rejects A's proposal, or that B chooses under considerations of desperation, or that B chooses under unjust background conditions,
or that the terms of the proposal are unfair-none of these considerations
defeat the claim that B may rationally choose to accept A's proposal. I do not
deny, of course, that A's deception or manipulation or B's background conditions themselves may lead B to irrationally accept A's proposal, nor do I deny
that such irrationalities compromise the voluntariness of B's decision and may
justify prohibiting such proposals or invalidating the acceptance of such proposals. This would be most obviously true in cases such as Automobile, Dance
Studio, and Psychotherapy, and might also be true of cases such as Surrogacy,
Organs, Experimentation, and Norplant. I do want to claim that it is important
to distinguish between the cases in which A has acted wrongly because his
proposal distorts the rationality of B's choice and the cases in which A acts
wrongly because he creates a certain objective situation for B, but where B
acts perfectly rationally given that objective situation (as in Extortion). To
anticipate two topics that we will be discussing later on in this Symposium,
there is no reason to think that plea bargaining typically compromises the
rationality of B's decision to accept a plea, whatever else we may want to say
about it. By contrast, there may be reason to think that behavior that results in
allegedly coerced confessions does compromise the rationality of B's decision
to confess, putting aside other objections to such behavior.
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Moral Judgments
There are several different moral claims that we might want to advance
with respect to agreements that are described as coerced or exploitative. Here
are three or four:
Condemnation
It is wrong for A to make some proposals. This is certainly the case with
respect to those cases in which A proposes to render B worse off than B's
moralized baseline if B rejects A's proposal, as in Extortion and perhaps in
Drowning. But we might well regard A's proposal as wrong, even if A does
not propose to violate B's moralized baseline if B rejects A's proposal. This
might be true when A proposes unfair terms (as in AZT, Unfair Rescue, Lumber) or violates notions of incommensurability or commodification, as in Stripper, Lecherous Millionare, Organs, and Norplant.
Prohibition and Invalidation
In some cases, we think it justifiable to prohibit A from making proposals,
or we may regard the acceptance of the proposal as invalid or not binding on
B. This is most obviously so in the paradigmatic cases of coercion such as
Extortion, in which A proposes to render B worse off than B's moralized
baseline if B rejects A's proposal. The interesting question is whether there
are reasons to prohibit proposals which would not violate B's moralized baseline if rejected, and to treat as invalid agreements that are advantageous to
B-if (for example) the terms are unfair or they are made under unjust or
desperate background conditions. It is worth emphasizing here that there may
be relatively little distance between prohibition and invalidation. It may be
thought that we can allow A to make a proposal but not treat B's acceptance
as binding. This suggestion is often made with respect to commercial surrogacy. 8 But that solution will generally prove to be unstable. For if A knows
that B's acceptance will not be treated as valid and binding, the transaction
will typically not occur, and bracketing whatever interests A may have in the
matter, the present point is that if the transaction does not occur, then B will
not obtain the benefit from the transaction that she sought.
There are at least three different sorts of reasons that might be offered for
the prohibition or invalidation of mutually advantageous consensual transactions. First, it is possible that if we prohibit or refuse to enforce grossly unfair
transactions, then A will propose fair (or less unfair) terms rather than choose
not to transact with B. This will often occur when A is in a position to secure
monopoly rents as in AZT, Unfair Rescue, Lumber, and may even apply to
cases, such as Ticket Scalping, when B's position is neither unjust nor desperate nor even unfortunate. We can refer to this as strategic intervention.
Second, we may consider prohibiting or refusing to enforce certain trans-

28.

See supra note 26.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:4

actions not because of their effects on the parties to the transaction but because of their effects on third parties. It is, for example, argued that pornography has harmful effects on virtually all women because it reduces their perceived value as persons, even if pornography is not harmful, all things considered, for those women who are portrayed in pornography and who are
compensated for their services." Similarly, it may be argued that permitting
or enforcing transactions such as Surrogacy would have harmful effects on
women as a class, because such agreements reinforce inequalities of gender,
although those transactions might not be harmful, all things considered, to the
surrogates themselves, who are compensated for their services.'
Third, we may consider prohibiting or refusing to enforce certain transactions not because it would be clearly better for B or for third parties, but because such transactions are immoral, for reasons involving commodification or
incommensurability. Such moralistic or perfectionist arguments for prohibition
are sometimes made with respect to case such as Stripper, Organs, Surrogacy,
Lecherous Millionare, Experimentation, and Norplant. Note that unlike strategic intervention, which seeks to encourage a transaction between A and B on
fairer terms, moralistic arguments typically maintain that A and B should not
transact at all-even if B might reasonably regard herself as better off if the
transaction were to occur.
Background Injustice
In some cases, we may be less concerned with criticizing or prohibiting
A's proposal than with calling attention to the injustice or wrongness of the
conditions under which it is rational for B to accept A's proposal, and with
arguing for the repair of those conditions. It is, however, of capital importance
to distinguish arguments for the repair of background conditions from arguments for prohibiting transactions given those background conditions.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In the way of summarizing and concluding these remarks, I want to make
three general points. The first general point is that the notions of coercion and
exploitation can be used to describe several quite distinct worries about proposals and acceptances. For example, I have argued that there is an important
distinction between those proposals that distort the rationality of B's decision
and those in which B acts rationally and to her own benefit under the objective conditions in which she finds herself. I have also argued that there is an
important distinction between those cases in which the alleged coerciveness of
A's proposal turns on whether A proposes to make B worse off than B's

29. "The mass production of pornography universalizes the violation of the women in it,
spreading it to all women, who are then exploited, used, abused, and reduced as a result of men's
consumption of it" CATHARiNE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMNST THEORY OF THE STATE
247 (1989).
30. As Debra Satz puts it, "[Surrogacyl contracts will turn women's labor into something
that is used and controlled by others and will reinforce gender stereotypes that have been used to
justify the unequal treatment of women." Debra Satz, Markets in Women's Reproductive Labor, 21
PHuL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 123-24 (1992).
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moralized baseline (as in Extortion) and those in which A acts exploitatively
because he takes advantage of unjust or desperate background conditions (as
in Lumber), but where A does not propose to make B worse off than B's
moralized baseline if B rejects A's proposal and where A's proposal does not
distort B's decision-making capacity.
The second general point is that the moral upshots that stem from some
worries about transactions may well be different from the moral upshots that
stem from other worries. Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that the
phrase "coercive proposals" can legitimately be used to describe proposals to
violate B's moral baseline, such as Extortion and Drowning, but that it can
also be used to describe proposals and acceptances made under conditions of
desperation or injustice, such as Surgery, Organs, and Experimentation, but
where A would not violate B's moral baseline by making no proposal at all.
Still, it does not follow that we should prohibit proposals or invalidate acceptances on grounds of coercion in the latter cases, just because we should prohibit proposals or invalidate acceptances on grounds of coercion in the former
cases. To press this point a bit further, consider the following argument:
1. If a proposal is coercive, then its acceptance is not binding.
2. Proposal X is coercive because A threatens to violate B's
moralized baseline if B rejects A's proposal.
3. Proposal Y is coercive because, say, its acceptance stems
from desperation or unjust background conditions.
4. Therefore, just as the acceptance of Proposal X is not binding on B, the acceptance of Proposal Y is not binding on B.
The problem with the argument is that the characteristics of the type of
proposal that underlies the coerciveness assumed by (1) and true in (2) may be
quite different than the characteristics that underlie the coerciveness of proposals assumed by (3). Thus (4) does not follow from these premises, even
though (2) and (3) are both true, given their different accounts of coercive
proposals. Such arguments run the risk of falling into the fallacy of equivocation.
My final general point relates to those proposals that are thought to be
coercive because they arise out of desperation or injustice. And here I wish to
make three points. First, our propensity to worry about certain transactions
may well be an important indicator that the background conditions that give
rise to those transactions should be repaired. Second, that B accepts A's proposal under conditions of desperation or injustice signifies nothing with respect
to the moral quality of A's proposal and signifies nothing with respect to
whether A's acceptance of B's proposal should be regarded as valid or binding. Recall Fair Rescue, Surgery, and POW. In all of these cases it is arguable
that B's status quo is so desperate that B has no viable alternative but to accept A's proposal. But there is nothing obviously wrong with A's proposal in
any of these cases, and I can see no reason not to regard B as bound by his
acceptance of A's proposal. How to determine when agreements born of desperation or injustice should and should not be treated as valid is one of the
more important challenges presented by such agreements. Third, whatever our
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concerns about the unjust or desperate background conditions under which
transactions are made, we must still decide-as a matter of non-ideal theory-whether we want to prohibit or invalidate those transactions that do occur
under these conditions, as for example, in Organs. For when the day is done,
and on the assumption that A is not required to repair B's background conditions, we must decide whether B should be permitted to engage in a transaction with A that B reasonably regards as beneficial to B, particularly given
that B may reasonably regard efforts to prohibit or invalidate such transactions
as adding insult to the injury of her background conditions. We can call A's
offer coercive and/or exploitative, but such labels will not resolve that moral
problem.
Having said that, it does not follow that the best moral answer is always
to allow A to propose and B to accept any proposal that would be advantageous to B and rational for B to accept. For reasons I have noted in my reference to strategic intervention, it would often be better for B, ex ante, if A
were not allowed to make certain proposals to B and if B were not bound by
any such acceptance. And that suggests one plausible approach to determining
when A should be permitted to make a proposal and when B's acceptance of
that proposal should be regarded as binding, namely, to ask whether, ex ante,
B would want A to be permitted to make such a proposal and would want to
be held to the terms of his acceptance, ex post. For example, I think that B
might well think that if he were to find himself a soldier in the position of
being killed or surrendering, he would like A to be able to take him as a
POW, and similar things could be said about the offer of life-saving surgery.
On the other hand, it is less clear what would be said about Norplant, or Organs, or Experimentation, or Stripper. Again, to say it is less clear is to say it
is less clear. Some regard these as easy cases for prohibition. I do not. In any
case, if I am right, conceptual analysis of notions such as coercion and exploitation will be of little help.

